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Abstract  
How has Russian industry responded to climate change? Understanding industry narratives on 
climate change is an important element of Russia’s broader climate change discourse. This 
chapter focuses specifically on Russia’s largest oil and gas companies, which hold significant 
responsibility for the country’s GHG emissions and whose participation in global attempts to 
address climate change is vital. It considers how companies have conceptualised the issue of 
climate change, and how this links to broader narratives within Russia and internationally. The 
evidence indicates an emphasis on energy saving and efficiency, technology and industrial 
modernisation, and limited direct engagement on climate change policy and mitigation efforts. 
Oil and gas industry discourse on climate change is set within a market-based framework and 
contiguous with government policy.  
Introduction  
Industry and business actors are key players in the fight against climate change. They hold 
significant responsibility when it comes to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and their 
participation is vital in global efforts to reduce emissions. They can be powerful political and 
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economic actors, with the ability to shape government policy and wider discussions in society 
on climate. It matters, therefore, what these companies say and do in relation to climate change.  
 
This discussion will concentrate specifically on oil and gas companies. Overall, the energy 
sector is the largest contributor to Russia’s GHG emissions. According to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the energy sector was responsible for 82.16% of 
Russia’s total GHG emissions (without land use, land use change and forestry) in 2012 
(UNFCCC, 2015). The key question this chapter seeks to explore relates to how Russian 
industry understands the issue of climate change. That is, do companies acknowledge climate 
change as an issue? If so, how do they talk about climate change? How have they understood 
and conceptualised the issue? What are their priorities, how do they seek to address climate 
change, and what policy solutions do they advocate? It is about the disclosure of information, 
corporate understanding and framing, and industry narratives on climate change. 
Understanding industry narratives on climate change is an important element of Russia’s 
broader climate change discourse. 
 
There is a substantial body of literature which explores the relationship between climate, 
politics, and business.  The role of business in governing climate change and shaping policy 
has featured heavily, with works examining the push for self-regulation and other forms of 
private governance (Hoffman, 2005; Bulkeley and Newell, 2015), support for emissions 
trading schemes (Meckling, 2011), and the emphasis on management processes, policy 
influence and image rather than meaningful GHG reductions (Jones and Levy, 2007), for 
example. 
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As early entrants into global climate politics, fossil fuel companies have been the focus for 
much research, with works charting the aggressive lobbying against action on climate change 
by companies such as Exxon and Chevron (Newell and Paterson, 1998: 683). After this initial 
opposition, attention shifted to the emergence of a second stream of corporate political 
involvement, with Kolk and Pinkse noting the move towards engagement with market 
responses to climate change (2007: 202). These divergent policy responses from the oil 
industry have been charted by Pulver (2007). Research has also expanded on different 
strategies adopted by oil multinationals (Levy & Kolk, 2002; van den Hove et al., 2002; Levy, 
2005).  
 
While Russia has been largely excluded from this literature, a limited number of works have 
touched on the role of Russian business actors in climate politics, including through their 
support for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Andonova, 2008), and interest in Joint 
Implementation projects (Korppoo, 2007). The attitudes of specific industrial sectors within 
Russia towards climate change has been thus far overlooked, with the exception of work by the 
present author on the metals and mining sector which pointed to the strong resistance to climate 
policy from the coal industry (Martus, 2018). 
 
This chapter also draws on literature which explores discourse on climate change, particularly 
from a business or industry perspective. Works have explored a variety of themes, including 
for example, ExxonMobil’s corporate discourse on global warming, with Livesey examining 
how public advertisements were used by the company to ‘promote particular corporate 
understandings of the problem of the natural environment and legitimate the corporate stance’ 
 4 
 
(2002: 118). There are a number of competing frames, or discourses, on climate change: 
including Hajer’s (1995) ‘environmental modernization’. According to this, climate change 
action is framed within an economic development paradigm (Taylor, 2013: 26). As Levy notes, 
this discourse ‘puts its faith in the technological, organizational, and financial resources of the 
private sector, voluntary partnerships between government agencies and business, flexible 
market-based measures, and the application of environmental management techniques’ (2005: 
93). Climate change becomes a problem that can be solved through the market. This chapter 
explores how the Russian experience fits within this broader context.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. A brief introduction to the core tenets of Russian government 
policy and relations with the oil and gas sector is given. Second, methodological considerations 
arising from this study are discussed. An analysis of climate change discourse within the oil 
and gas sector is then presented, followed by a discussion of key implications arising from this 
research, and conclusions. 
Oil, gas and the state in Russia  
The oil and gas sector plays a central role in Russia’s economy. In 2016 for example, oil and 
gas revenues brought in 4 844 billion roubles to the federal budget, or 36% of total revenue for 
the year (Ministerstvo Finansov, 2018). There are a number of large companies operating in 
the sector, several of which are examined below. These companies are both private and state-
owned, with the oil and gas sector having undergone considerable changes since the end of the 
Soviet Union. The sale of previously state-owned enterprises in the 1990s (including the 
notorious ‘loan-for-shares’ auctions) saw the oil sector largely privatised by the end of 1998 
and fragmented (Gustafson, 2012: 98-9). The industry then began a process of reconsolidation, 
with private oligarch-owned companies like Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz and Yukos emerging 
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(Gustafson, 2012: 100-1). Since 2002 however, there has been an increasing state presence in 
the industry, with Rosneft emerging as a particularly powerful actor. The gas sector in Russia 
is even more concentrated, and dominated by state-owned company Gazprom.1   
 
While Russia’s overall approach to climate policy has been described by other authors in this 
volume, there are a number of policies of direct relevance to the oil and gas sector. Some of 
these policies directly address climate change mitigation, while others touch on related issues 
such as energy efficiency and the development of renewables. Ultimately however, the primary 
goal of Russian energy policy is to actively support the industry. The principle policy document 
pertaining to the oil and gas sector is the Energy Strategy to 2030. The stated primary goal is 
to maximise the efficient use of energy resources to ensure economic growth. Reference is 
made in the document to the need to reduce GHG emissions in the energy sector. Specific 
legislation that obliges companies to report their GHG emissions is currently under 
development (Davydova, 2017; Pravitel’stvo Rossii, 2018).  
 
Russia’s energy sector is highly inefficient by global standards, and consequently, there have 
been a number of attempts to introduce energy saving and efficiency measures. One of the most 
important of these is a decree (Ukaz 889) issued by then President Medvedev on 4 June 2008 
‘On some measures to improve the energy and environmental efficiency of the Russian 
economy’. This aimed to reduce the energy intensity of the economy by at least 40% by 2020, 
and called on the government to introduce a number of measures including new laws to 
encourage businesses to use energy-saving technology. Beyond this, the government 
introduced regulations in 2012 on the use of associated petroleum gas (APG), which has often 
been considered a waste product by the oil and gas industry, and burnt. A number of regulations 
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have been put in place by the government to limit this practice, including a 2012 decree 
restricting flaring to no more than 5% (Korppoo and Kokorin, 2017: 120-1). There have also 
been some attempts to encourage the use of and investment in renewable energy, with a number 
of government orders and decrees introduced (see Korppoo and Kokorin, 2017: 121). Despite 
considerable potential however, growth in renewables have been slow (IEA, 2014: 219). The 
analysis that follows considers the extent to which these policies have had an effect on Russia’s 
oil and gas companies, in shaping their understanding and response to the issue.  
Methodology 
The Russian oil and gas sector has been chosen as the focus for analysis, given its significance 
for the Russian economy, and the sector’s role as a major producer of GHG emissions. There 
is an additional goal of collating, comparing and analysing reporting from major Russian oil 
and gas companies and making the contents of these reports available to a wider audience. 
 
To evaluate corporate responses to climate policy, a survey of the eight largest oil and gas 
companies according to the Ekspert 400 rankings (Ekspert.ru, 2017) was undertaken (see table 
7.1 below). Together, these companies represent a substantial portion of Russia’s oil and gas 
sector. Gazprom alone accounts for 66% of Russian gas output, which is 11% of global 
production (Gazprom, n.d.), and Rosneft is responsible for 40% of Russia’s oil production, and 
6% of global production (Rosneft, n.d.). Companies are both private, such as Lukoil, and state-
owned corporations, such as Gazprom and Rosneft.2 
Company Volume of Sales in 2016 
(million rubles3) 
Gazprom 6 071 793,0 
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Lukoil 4 743 732,0 
Rosneft  4 134 000,0 
Surgutneftegaz 1 020 833,0 
Tatneft 580 127,0 
Novatek 537 472,0 
Bashneft 494 722,0 
Sakhalin Energy 304 810,0 
Table 7.1: Russia’s largest oil and gas companies (Source: Ekspert.ru, 2017) 
 
To assess what information about climate change mitigation efforts is disclosed, and identify 
corporate discourses on climate change, analysis was based on Sustainability Reports (SR), 
Environment Reports (ER), or Annual Reports (AR) where SR’s or ER’s were not available. 
Company websites were also examined. Sustainability, environmental, and annual reports are 
generally prepared in both Russian and English (with the exception of Bashneft, where only a 
Russian language SR was available). Where the English version has been used in this chapter, 
it has been checked against the Russian for consistency. Websites too are, for the most part, in 
both Russian and English. Some companies also prove other languages too: Sakhalin Energy 
for example has a Japanese language version.4 
 
These reports, together with company websites, represent key forms of corporate 
communication. They enable corporations to advertise themselves and their agenda. This 
advertising is, for the most part, directed at company stakeholders, including investors, 
shareholders and the government, but also to the wider community. There is a vast literature 
on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting, much of which concentrates on 
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identifying motivations for firms in issuing these voluntary documents. This might be, for 
example, to demonstrate their commitment to the principles of CSR, or for ‘greenwashing’ 
purposes to influence stakeholder perceptions (Mahoney et al, 2013). There is also considerable 
discussion about the credibility of information (e.g. Michelon et al, 2015). The lack of 
independent verification of reported results and activities in these reports presents something 
of a challenge. However, despite issues with determining the accuracy of information, and the 
scepticism surrounding motivations for CSR disclosure, they remain a valuable tool for 
corporate actors to demonstrate their commitment to CSR (Allen and Craig, 2016). For the 
purposes of this research, corporate reporting on the environment from the Russian oil and gas 
sector helps us assess how companies want to be perceived by external actors and how the 
companies themselves regard certain issues. That is, are Russia’s oil and gas companies 
interested in generating positive environmental PR by demonstrating how they address climate 
change, or is it low on the list of priorities? 
 
The majority of companies provide SR’s. These reports mostly follow a similar format, based 
on international reporting standards.5 These documents provide information on corporate 
activities, including production results for the year, an overview of assets, new projects and 
future developments, and corporate governance. They also discuss environmental impact and 
management issues of the company, outline environmental priorities and spending. Reports 
cover a wide range of issues, including air, water and soil protection, waste management, and 
biodiversity conservation. Projects involving community groups and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are discussed. Personnel, and health and safety issues are also covered 
in the SR and AR documents. Some companies, such as Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz, provide 
stand-alone environment reports, which concentrate specifically on company environmental 
policies and activities.   
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Based on an analysis of the available documents, a series of key themes emerged that touched 
on the issue of climate in some form or another. Both climate specific (such as direct statements 
or positions on climate change, or reporting on GHG emissions and mitigation efforts) and 
climate related material (such as energy saving and efficiency measures, and investment in 
renewables) were included. Information about corporate non-climate environmental programs 
was also included for comparative purposes. These themes highlight the priorities of 
companies, and their understanding of the issue, and are used to build a picture of industry 
discourse on climate change. 
Industry framings of climate change 
Examining the environmental reporting contained within AR, SR and ER from Russia’s oil and 
gas majors provides us with a valuable insight into how these large companies conceptualise 
the issue of climate change, and how companies think the issue should be addressed. This 
section first discusses direct references to climate change and identifies those corporate actors 
with clear positions on climate. Second, GHG emission reduction efforts are discussed together 
with the related issue of APG utilisation. Finally, corporate energy saving and efficiency 
measures are discussed. 
 
Stand-alone position on climate  
Of the companies surveyed, only Lukoil had a stand-alone position on climate change, although 
even this is limited in terms of what it covers. Lukoil’s ‘stance on climate change’ states that 
the company takes an active part in discussions with the government on GHG regulation, and 
notes that Lukoil has developed its own system for managing emissions to respond to the issue 
of climate change (Lukoil, n.d. -c). A number of GHG reduction projects initiated by Lukoil 
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are listed. Framed in market-based terms, it is noted that if these projects are successful, the 
‘ultimate goal could be to generate revenues by selling emission reduction units and to further 
reinvest the generated funds into new environmental and energy efficiency projects’ (Lukoil, 
n.d. -c).  
 
Further to its official ‘stance’ on climate, on the English version of the company’s website, 
Lukoil ‘as an environmentally responsible company, PJSC LUKOIL admits that global climate 
change prevention effort is extremely important’ (Lukoil, n.d. -b). Similarly, on the Russian 
version of the website the company ‘recognises the importance of measures to prevent global 
climate change, supports Russia’s participation in global efforts to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases’ (Lukoil, n.d. -c). Similar statements exist in the 2015-6 SR, where it is noted, 
for example, that ‘LUKOIL acknowledges the importance of combating global climate change, 
and supports Russia’s contribution to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’ 
(Lukoil, 2015-6: 49). It is significant that Lukoil establishes its support for international climate 
policy efforts and Russia’s participation, as it is the only oil and gas company examined to 
explicitly do so.  
 
However, despite this attention given to expressing direct support for climate policy efforts, 
Lukoil’s strategies to address the issue are very similar to the other companies examined. For 
example, Lukoil’s Health, Safety and Environmental Policy includes climate related goals 
including achieving a ‘higher utilization ratio of associated petroleum gas’, the ‘increased 
output of eco-friendly fuels compliant with European standards’, ‘efficient control of 
greenhouse gas emissions’, and the efficient use of natural resources through the ‘introduction 
of resource-saving and energy efficient technologies and use of alternative energy sources’ 
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(Lukoil, n.d. -a). Other oil and gas companies also address these issues, as we will explore 
below.  
 
While lacking a stand-alone company position on climate, a number of the other companies 
include statements addressing climate change as an issue in their corporate reporting. The 
deputy chair of Gazprom’s Management Committee, Vitaly Markelov, for example, stated that 
‘Gazprom constantly improves the energy efficiency and reduces anthropogenic impact on the 
environment through the application of advanced technologies and equipment’ and that the 
company ‘takes part in solution [sic] of global air pollution issues by promoting natural gas as 
an environmentally safe motor fuel. Owing to the use of natural gas, energy balance of Russia 
is one of the “greenest” in the world’ (Gazprom, 2016: 5). Again, we see a focus on energy 
efficiency as a central policy solution, and an emphasis on new technology. Markelov’s 
statement also introduces the idea of natural gas as a green, climate-friendly source of energy, 
a sentiment (unsurprisingly) echoed by the big gas producers. Novatek too, for example, states 
that an intended aim of its environmental policy is to develop the market for ‘environmentally 
safe’ gas-engine fuels (Novatek, 2016b).  
 
As we might expect, the need to balance climate mitigation efforts with economic concerns is 
a core element of the industry narrative. This is highlighted by Novatek, for example, which 
points to company participation in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and disclosure of 
information on GHG emissions and energy efficiency. Novatek’s AR states that ‘by taking part 
in these projects the Company intends to achieve a balance between the climate change risks 
and efficiency of investment projects’ (Novatek, 2016a: 55). Surgutneftegaz’s report also 
briefly mentions climate change, noting simply that ‘the Company implements measures on 
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prevention of global climate change, develops the corporate system of accounting and 
management of greenhouse gas emissions’ (2016: 34). 
 
Interestingly, there was little evidence to suggest climate change was considered a major risk 
to business operations to any large extent by the companies in question, despite the challenges 
posed by a changing climate, particularly in terms of physical risk to infrastructure and 
equipment. This is despite the frequent use of discourse on ‘risk’ to frame corporate responses 
to climate change observed by Wright and Nyberg for example (2015). The closest any 
company came to this idea of risk was Novatek, in its Environmental Policy. The policy sets 
out a number of environmental objectives and aims to ‘take into account the risks and assess 
the consequences of climatic changes for the activities of the company’ (Novatek, 2016b). 
However, all companies did address physical risks in broader terms (oil spill and emergency 
situation preparations for example) in the AR & SRs.  
 
Finally, the companies examined did not appear to be heavily engaged with international 
developments in climate policy. Three companies (Gazprom, Bashneft and Sakhalin Energy) 
made reference to the Paris Agreement, but there was no discussion of content or implications 
for company operations (Bashneft, 2015: 44; Gazprom, 2016: 68; Sakhalin Energy, 2016: 72). 
Some clues were provided regarding company involvement in international bodies, with 
Rosneft, Lukoil and Sakhalin Energy, referring to participation in the UN Global Compact, a 
voluntary initiative designed at promoting sustainable business practices. They are the only 
Russian oil and gas companies involved, although none participate in the ‘Caring for Climate 
Initiative’ which is specifically aimed at addressing corporate responses to climate change.  
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GHG emissions and reduction efforts  
All companies surveyed reported their GHG emissions or air pollutant emissions (a broader 
category). Of note, however, is the fact that there were inconsistencies between the companies 
surveyed in regards to what is reported and how emissions are calculated. Sakhalin Energy, for 
example, calculates its emissions in accordance with the guidelines developed by the American 
Petroleum Institute (Sakhalin Energy, 2016: 72), while Novatek and Bashneft reports that they 
use the 2015 Russian government guidelines (Bashneft, 2015: 45; Novatek, 2016c: 76;). Four 
companies also report their emissions to the CDP: Lukoil, Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz and 
Novatek.  
 
The lack of consistency in relation to GHG reporting is due to a gap in government policy. In 
January 2018, the government’s commission on legislative activity had approved a draft bill 
which provides the legal framework to establish a system of reporting GHG emissions at the 
level of individual organisations (Pravitel’stvo Rossii, 2018). However, at the time of writing, 
the Ministry for Natural Resources was undertaking ‘additional discussions’ with the business 
community on the matter (TASS, 2018). It remains to be seen whether the bill will be submitted 
to parliament in its current form.  
 
Stated measures for reducing GHG emissions are similar across the different companies 
surveyed, and usually fall within a company’s broader energy saving plans. Gazprom, for 
example, prioritises GHG control as part of its corporate strategy, noting that ‘energy saving 
practices and measures provide for the biggest GHG emission reduction at the gas 
transportation facilities’ (Gazprom, 2016: 25). Rosneft claims to be ‘working to lower its 
greenhouse gas emissions through initiatives provided in its Gas Investment Program and 
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Energy Saving Program’ (Rosneft, 2016: 74). Sakhalin Energy, in response to a stakeholder 
question about whether the company was planning further reductions in GHG emissions, 
claimed that ‘the company is planning to maintain its current greenhouse gas emissions level 
at this stage. However, we are improving the energy efficiency of our assets as part of process 
optimisation. The implementation of these activities also has an effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction’ (Sakhalin Energy, 2016: 143).  
 
A related issue concerns APG utilisation, or gas flaring, which is a major issue for the oil and 
gas industry. All eight companies identified APG utilisation as a priority, in line with 
government regulation, as noted above. A number of companies claim to have met the 
government’s 95% utilisation target, including Tatneft (96.44%), Surgutneftegaz (99%) and 
Sakhalin Energy (96.3%).6 Lukoil, which is ‘approaching the target of 95%’ (2015-6: 3), uses 
language to promote a ‘green image’ of the company, stating that, ‘for over a decade, LUKOIL 
has been investing in APG utilization projects, having started its APG flaring reduction effort 
long before legislators made it mandatory’ (2015-6: 47). In terms of framing however, little 
attempt is made to represent APG utilisation efforts as directly linked to climate change and 
emissions reduction efforts, and activities are reported within a wider framework of energy 
savings and efficient use of resources. 
Energy saving and efficiency  
All companies identified energy saving and efficiency as a key priority, and actively seek to 
promote their activities in this area as part of their environmental reporting. All companies have 
some kind of energy and resource saving program or policy. Rosneft’s SR, for example, notes 
the company’s success at meeting fuel and energy saving targets and states that ‘lower 
operating costs resulting, in particular, from low fuel and energy consumption rates, along with 
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higher production volumes are key for Rosneft to maintain its leading market positions’ 
(Rosneft, 2016: 81). Similarly, Tatneft’s AR points out that ‘in the context of constantly 
growing tariffs of natural monopolies on energy resources, transportation services and increase 
of hydrocarbon production costs, the Company makes the comprehensive efforts to create 
maximum reserves for resource saving in all its business activities, including energy saving’ 
(Tatneft, 2016: 52). The language used by companies to describe their efforts in this area 
demonstrates an economic framing of energy saving and efficiency. 
 
A closely linked issue relates to industrial modernisation and an emphasis on new technology, 
which, similar to energy efficiency, corresponds to a market-based framing of climate change. 
While the Russian oil and gas companies surveyed did not draw direct links with climate 
policy, all AR and SR used language which focused on technology and modernisation. Igor 
Sechin’s statement in Rosneft’s SR highlights this point. Sechin, as CEO of the company, notes 
that ‘striving to become a technology leader in the global energy sector, Rosneft consistently 
drives innovation by deploying new technologies, upgrading existing production processes and 
coming up with other initiatives’ (Rosneft, 2016: 4). Lukoil, too, is ‘focused on generating 
ideas, searching for and using new technologies (including those specifically aimed at reducing 
the consumption of natural resources), materials and energy with the highest output possible’ 
(Lukoil, 2015-6: 21). Gazprom draws attention to its ‘Innovative Development Program’ which 
aims at the ‘continuous improvement of technology’ and ‘technological leadership’ to improve 
environmental safety and energy efficiency within the organisation (Gazprom, 2016: 64). 
Finally, Novatek and Rosneft both also make note of their involvement in best available 
technology ‘technical working groups’ (Novatek, 2016c: 26; Rosneft, 2016: 69), designed to 
develop guidelines for each industrial sector (Martus, 2017a: 279). The introduction of the ‘best 
available technology’ into Russian legislation has been a key development in recent years, and 
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aims to use technology to improve environmental outcomes in industrial processes (Martus, 
2017a).  
 
There appears to be only minor interest amongst the companies sampled in renewable energy 
and investment. As noted above, government regulations are in place in Russia to encourage 
use of renewables (see Korppoo and Kokorin, 2017: 121), but with only limited effect so far. 
Lukoil, Novatek and Gazprom all make note of their use of renewables, with Lukoil reporting 
that 4% of ‘total energy generated by the Company’s power facilities is from renewables’ 
(Lukoil, 2015-6: 20); and Novatek noting their use of solar panels and wind turbines along their 
pipelines (Novatek, 2016c: 77). Gazprom comments that it ‘supports the use of alternative 
energy sources where it is economically and technically feasible’, and provides a breakdown 
of generation by source (Gazprom, 2016: 49). However, none of the companies surveyed focus 
significant attention on the issue, suggesting that renewable energy use and investment is not 
a core part of corporate discourse on climate for oil and gas companies. 
Discussion 
A key issue to emerge from the analysis is how these industry narratives on climate change fit 
within a broader Russian and international context. That is, is the oil and gas industry 
exceptional in contrast with other sectors in Russia? How does the industry’s framing of 
climate change compare with the international industry discourse on climate change?   
 
Within the SR, ER and AR documents analysed, corporate reporting on climate policy and 
climate related policies was limited in comparison with other aspects of environmental action. 
When it comes to environmental protection, each of the companies surveyed provide extensive 
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information about a range of issues, including waste and water management, and biodiversity 
conservation. They also all have some form of stand-alone policy on environmental protection, 
in contrast with climate. These documents or statements are used to set targets and identify key 
environmental tasks. As an example, Surgutneftegaz lists nine ‘basic principles’ in its 
environmental policy, including environmental monitoring, rational use of resources based on 
the implementation of ‘innovative environmentally efficient and resource saving technologies’ 
(Surgutneftegaz, 2016: 6). The company has a list of responsibilities to implement these 
principles, including tasks such as adhering to federal legislation, assessment of environmental 
risks and impact assessments, and improving environmental safety (Surgutneftegaz, 2016: 7). 
Information is also provided about stakeholder engagement. Both Lukoil and Rosneft make 
note of joint activities with the WWF Russia for example. Lukoil, according to its report, signed 
a cooperation agreement with WWF, and conducted joint expeditions with the Marine Mammal 
Council to monitor walrus populations in the Barents Sea (Lukoil, 2015-6: 42). According to 
its SR, Rosneft consulted with the WWF on preserving biodiversity and reducing the impact 
of oil spills (Rosneft, 2016: 68). This does not mean these activities are necessarily anything 
more than ‘environmental PR’; many of the tasks set by companies are vague with little clue 
given as to how they will be implemented, or they are tasks required by law anyway. AR and 
SR documents do not contain independent verification of company activities. However, what 
is demonstrated by this analysis, is that the level of attention paid to the environment, in contrast 
with climate issues, is significantly higher. 
 
While extensive research across economic sectors in Russia is lacking, a study by the present 
author of Russia’s metals and mining sector provides a useful comparison (Martus, 2018). 
Similar to the oil and gas sector, the majority of metals and mining companies surveyed had a 
focus on energy saving and efficiency. As noted above, energy saving and efficiency measures 
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have been a core focus of government climate policy efforts, and so we can consider oil and 
gas framing of the issue to be closely aligned with both the government and the metals and 
mining sector on this issue. 
 
Beyond energy efficiency however, differences emerge. The metals and mining companies 
were characterised by strong variation within the sector in terms of response to climate change 
and associated policy developments. While some companies were not supportive of action on 
climate, and either actively resisted or were found to be disengaged from the political 
discussion, a number of companies took a proactive role and sought to lobby the government 
to introduce GHG mitigation regulation and encourage greater Russian participation in 
international policy debates (Martus, 2018: 9). Aluminium company Rusal, and its oligarch 
owner Oleg Deripaska, was particularly active in this regard. Several companies had position 
statements broadly supportive of domestic and international efforts to address climate change, 
and joined domestic or international business partnerships such as the Climate Partnership of 
Russia or the UN Global Compact ‘Caring for Climate’, aimed at coordinating business 
commitments on climate (4-5)?. This level of activity was not found amongst the oil and gas 
companies examined. As noted above, Lukoil was the only company to have an official 
position on climate change and the only one to state that it supported international efforts to 
combat climate change. However, even this appeared limited, and beyond expressing support, 
Lukoil did not appear to play an active role in climate policy debates within Russia or 
internationally. On the whole, the variation present within the metals and mining sector was 
not found to be as significant in the case of Russian oil and gas companies, with the majority 
of them displaying very limited interest in climate policy and GHG mitigation efforts. 
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International comparisons are hampered by a relative lack of sector specific research. We 
would not expect a lack of interest or active disregard of climate mitigation policies to be 
unusual amongst global oil and gas majors. Although, as noted above, a number of works have 
pointed to the significant divergence in policy responses amongst oil and gas companies, 
particularly from the late 1990s. ExxonMobil for example is identified as a major opponent of 
climate policy, while other companies such as BP and later Shell took a more supportive stance 
(e.g. Skjærseth & Skodvin, 2001; van den Hove et al, 2002; Pulver, 2007). However, we would 
ultimately expect fossil fuel companies, both in Russia and globally, to be some of the most 
resistant to climate policy, given that climate change mitigation efforts therefore pose a threat 
to the operations of these companies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on industry and its understanding of climate change, as an important 
part of the broader discourse on climate change within Russia. As examined, all of the oil and 
gas majors present their plans to reduce GHG emissions and air pollutants, and outline 
measures to reduce gas flaring. Energy efficiency and resource saving measures are explained 
in each report, and there is an emphasis on technology and industrial modernisation as a way 
of addressing the challenges presented by climate change and protecting the environment more 
broadly. The analysis provides clear evidence on an industry discourse on climate very much 
set within a market based framework. It also highlights the lack of policy ambition on the part 
of the government, with delays to GHG reporting requirements and policies to encourage 
renewables that appear to be of limited interest for oil and gas companies. 
 
So, while climate related issues such as energy saving and efficiency do receive attention, there 
are clear limits on the extent to which oil and gas companies are prepared to engage. As we 
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have seen, there is only very limited direct discussion of climate change, with only one 
company surveyed issuing a stand-alone position on climate. There was little to no engagement 
on domestic or international policy developments, in contrast to some companies within the 
Russian metals and mining sector as noted. While some attention was given to maintaining a 
‘green’ reputation, the evidence suggested that climate was peripheral to this image. Finally, 
few companies gave consideration to the risk posed to their operations by a changing climate. 
For the most part, climate change seems to be of low importance for Russia’s oil and gas sector.   
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